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1. The title of this Article is a reference to the popular website http://
icanhascheezburger.com.  This website allows users to upload humorous photographs of 
cats or “lolcats” (shorthand for cat photographs that make you laugh out loud) with 
accompanying speech captions.  After users vote on which pictures are the funniest, the 
website features the most popular photos.  The collective joke within this website is that 
many of the cats speak with poor grammar and spelling.  By exemplifying how 
participatory culture fosters user participation, a sense of community, and a shared 
identity among Internet users, the whimsical icanhascheezburger.com is in sharp contrast 
with the culture of the legal profession, which emphasizes proper language, measured 
behavior, and formality.  See, e.g., Jenna Wortham, Once Just a Site with Funny Cat 
Pictures and Now a Web Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 13, 2010, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2010/06/14/technology/internet/14burger.html. 
* Associate Professor, Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School.
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I. Introduction
The Internet allows citizens to comment on public affairs with an 
amplified and unfiltered voice, creating an open, community-based 
culture where robust debate flourishes.  Users now have the 
autonomy to produce cultural meanings outside of traditional 
institutions such as large-scale media outlets and government entities. 
This new Internet-based culture of sharing and commenting has been 
labeled “participatory culture.”2  However, some of the ideals and 
practices of participatory culture clash with the traditional legal 
culture as it exists in the United States.  Specifically, professional 
conflicts are emerging with respect to blogs and emails where lawyers 
air caustic, uncensored, and highly critical views of the legal 
profession and the judiciary.  Although these online narratives often 
reflect a view that the structure of the legal system is badly broken, 
they may also run afoul of professional norms or ethical rules that 
prohibit attorneys from impugning the integrity of the legal system. 
This Article’s thesis is that as the democratic ideals inherent in 
participatory culture become more deeply embedded in our society, 
the legal profession should also evolve and embrace a more pluralistic 
and unconstrained approach toward professionalism. 
As I have written previously, the legal culture within the United 
States is a straight-laced culture, highly dependent on formalism and 
hierarchy.3  Cultural meanings, such as what it means to be a lawyer 
and the correct legal analysis that flows from a case, are tightly 
controlled by few—law professors,4 judges,5 and institutions, such as 
2. A participatory culture is “a culture with relatively low barriers to artistic
expression and civil engagement, strong support for creating and sharing one’s creations, 
and some type of informal mentorship whereby what is known by the most experienced is 
passed along to novices.”  Henry Jenkins et al., Confronting the Challenges of Participatory 
Culture: Media Education for the 21st Century 3 (2006), available at http://digital 
learning.macfound.org/atf/cf/%7B7E45C7E0-A3E0-4B89-AC9C-E807E1B0AE4E%7D/ 
JENKINS_WHITE_PAPER.PDF. 
3. See generally, Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How
Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155 
(2008). 
4. The law professor controls legal meanings by structuring classroom dialogue to
emphasize precedent and procedure, which tends to greatly limit the story of what 
happens in a case.  See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL 54–56 
(2007) (theorizing, from an ethnographic standpoint, how legal educational institutions 
reproduce formalistic thinking). 
5. The Cardozo-penned Palsgraf decision illustrates how judicial authors use the
clipped prose of legal formalism to strip all personal information and social context from a 
case.  See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., 
PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 112–13 (1976).  Jerome Frank also critiqued Cardozo 
for using “a private time-machine to transport himself back into 18th Century England” in 
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the American Bar Association (“ABA”).6  With respect to commonly 
accepted narratives for the legal profession and proper legal analysis 
in the classroom or courtroom, an analogy can be made to the “one-
to-many” model of mass media communication, where a few large 
entities controlled most of the information.7  Now, technology has 
given everyone the ability to comment and participate in the creation 
of cultural meanings.  The Internet also enables users to comment 
and critique with real-time immediacy, in contrast to the slower pace 
by which meaning was created in the older mass media system.8  Now 
that we are living in a “many-to-many” media environment, a culture 
clash is emerging within the legal profession where professional rules 
and norms have heretofore enforced a culture of restraint. 
This cultural conflict can be seen in electronic narratives that go 
“viral,”9 where lawyers comment on the lack of humanism within big 
law firm firing practices, expose the alienating work environments 
experienced by low-level contract attorneys, or criticize judges who 
show hostility toward criminal defense attorneys.  Within these 
order to translate “himself into a past alien speech environment.”  Anon Y. Mous (Jerome 
Frank), The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA. L. REV. 625, 631 (1943). 
Cardozo’s language allowed him to promote his prose as reasoned analysis when, in Judge 
Posner’s view, it was really a “substitution of words for thought.” RICHARD A. POSNER, 
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 119 (1990). Excised from Cardozo’s opinion are the 
facts that Mrs. Palsgraf was a “very poor” mother of three children who made $416 a year 
as a house cleaner with substantial legal and medical debts.  NOONAN, supra, at 125–28. 
6. Through its model rules of professional conduct (adopted by most states), the
ABA is an institution that controls the meanings with respect to lawyer professionalism. 
See Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar 
Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 672–73 (1994) (offering a perspective of the ABA’s 
model rules of professional conduct as the product of a few elite lawyers imposing their 
own view of professional conduct that excludes minority views). 
7. See, e.g., CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY 86 (2008) (explaining
traditional mass media communication as a “one-to-many” model); YOCHAI BENKLER, 
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND 
FREEDOM 3 (2006) (explaining how new technology now allows nonmarket participants to 
produce information in a decentralized way, in contrast with the older mass-media 
regime). 
8. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 491 (2010).
9. The Internet allows information to reach viral dimensions and impact a mass
audience in much the same way that a viral disease gets transmitted to the public.  See 
Eytan Adar & Lada A. Adamic, Tracking Information Epidemics in Blogspace, 2005 INST. 
ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENG’RS COMPUTER SOC’Y CONF. ON WEB INTELLIGENCE 
1–2, available at www.cond.org/trackingblogepidemics.pdf; David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg 
& Eva Tardos, Maximizing the Spread of Influence Through a Social Network, 9 ASS’N 
COMPUTING MACHINERY SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA 
MINING 137 (2003); Limor Shifman & Mike Thelwall, Assessing Global Diffusion with 
Web Memetics: The Spread and Evolution of a Popular Joke, 60 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & 
TECH. 2567, 2567 (2009). 
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electronic forums, lawyers regularly speak out against the characters 
(such as the law school administrators, judges, and elite attorneys) 
who they perceive to wield arbitrary power over them.  Often using a 
sarcastic and caustic tone, these narratives portray the practice of law 
as a dark, lonely, and alienating experience. 
These narratives question commonly held perceptions of what it 
means to be a lawyer and disclose experiences at odds with traditional 
understandings of a lawyer’s professional identity.  From a critical 
standpoint, they portray a broken legal profession, implicitly arguing 
that the liberal humanism the profession supposedly embodies does 
not apply to all lawyers.  These stories are, in effect, structural 
critiques of the profession.  Penned by the outliers of the legal 
profession, they provide a culturally valuable perspective on what it 
means to be an American lawyer in the twenty-first century. 
Nonetheless, such critical postings conflict with the notion that 
attorneys should not criticize the integrity of the legal profession or 
the judiciary.10  However, because they afford a valuable critique of 
the profession, professional norms and ethical rules should not 
operate to shut out these stories.  It is a positive development that 
technology gives ordinary attorneys the power to inform the culture 
of the profession, as opposed to previous models where only elite and 
powerful practitioners were given a voice.11 
Part II of this Article describes the characteristics of participatory 
culture relevant to the legal profession.  Part III explores the 
emerging format of the online lawyer narrative, and Part IV discusses 
its cultural value.  Part V analyzes the professionalism issues raised by 
these new narratives. 
II. Participatory Culture
“The term, participatory culture, contrasts with older notions of 
passive media spectatorship.”12  Consumers and media producers no 
10. See e.g., John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/ 
13lawyers.html (detailing recent conflicts between attorneys who blog about their 
professional experiences and bar ethics rules). 
11. Control over cultural meanings within the law profession is exemplified by the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were first promulgated at the 
beginning of the twentieth century by the most elite members of the bar and continue to 
be molded by leadership within the ABA, the majority of which consists of attorneys with 
corporate law firm practices.  See Mashburn, supra note 6, at 663, 669, 673 (1994). 
12. HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA 
COLLIDE 3 (2006) [hereinafter JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE]. 
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longer operate in separate roles; instead, they interact with each other 
under a new paradigm.13  For example, a person purchasing a product 
on Amazon.com might function as a traditional passive consumer 
buying a product in the marketplace.  However, technology also 
opens up the potential for the consumer to actively produce 
information about the product, by writing an online review.  On the 
Internet, “[t]he producers are the audience, the act of making is the 
act of watching, and every link is both a point of departure and a 
destination.”14 
A culture of sharing and collaborating, often outside traditional 
economic incentives, is one of the hallmarks of participatory culture. 
New technology has created a marked increase “in our ability to 
share, to cooperate with one another, and to take collective action, all 
outside the framework of traditional institutions and organizations.”15  
People are also demonstrating a remarkable eagerness to contribute 
to online social projects even though they do not receive direct 
economic compensation from these activities.16  Instead of economic 
fruits, persons contribute to projects out of simple altruistic desire or 
because of the ego boost that comes from seeing their work online.17  
Clay Shirky offers Wikipedia and Linux as examples of successful 
projects that have capitalized on the phenomenon of people desiring 
to collectively participate and contribute to reach an end goal.18  In 
the case of open-source software Linux, companies such as IBM have 
demonstrated that it is possible to profit from a product that is not 
owned in the traditional sense.19 
Community is another central theme within participatory 
culture.20  New interactive media technology fosters new kinds of 
13. Id.
14. Kevin Kelly, We Are the Web, WIRED, Aug. 2005, available at http://www.wired
.com/wired/archive/13.08/tech.html. 
15. SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 21.
16. Id. at 132–33.  See also, BENKLER, supra note 7, at 7 (explaining that new
technology has fostered a “robust ethic of open sharing,” where production is longer 
dependent on exclusive property rights). 
17. SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 132–33; ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE 
BAZAAR 53 (2001). 
18. SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 137, 239–40.
19. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 124; see also, SHIRKY, supra note 7 at 258–59 (“What
the open source movement teaches us is that the communal can be at least as durable as 
the commercial.”). 
20. Mary Chayko defines “community” as a “set of people who share a special kind
of identity and culture and regular, patterned social interaction.”  MARY CHAYKO, 
PORTABLE COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF ONLINE AND MOBILE 
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social communities, defined by common interests rather than by 
geography, which make valuable contributions to a society.21  People 
can now customize their social relations in ways that fit them better. 
Instead of relying on preexisting institutions (such as schools, 
religious institutions, churches, the Rotary Club, etc.) to meet one’s 
need for social connectivity, individuals can seek out new community 
relationships based on subjects that interest them.22  In online 
communities, members develop a shared repertoire and shared 
language,23 often developing “in-jokes” and specialized jargon that 
apply to the group’s identity.24  While some critics argue that 
technology has made life more alienating and lonely,25 others argue 
that the Internet enables people to “form real, consequential bonds 
with people [they] have never met face to face—and in this world of 
wireless computers and mobile devices [they] can do it nearly all the 
time, everywhere [they] go.”26 
Technology has also opened up discourse to many more 
individuals, leading to a freer flow of information and content.27  
Participatory culture contains new opportunities for “civic 
CONNECTEDNESS 6 (2008).  In a community, there is a sense of neighborliness, warmth, 
support, and belonging.  Id. 
21. Henry Jenkins et al., Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media
Education for the 21st Century 50 (2006), available at http://www.macfound.org (search for 
“Participatory Culture”) [hereinafter Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture] 
(explaining how digital networks “tap the participation of large-scale social 
communities.”); CHAYKO, supra note 20 at 29 (explaining how online communities 
emerge when “people who may be spatially separated focus on the same things, in much 
the same way, at the same time.”). 
22. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 367.  One example of a robust online community
would be the some ten million persons who play the online game World of Warcraft.  See 
CASTELLS, supra note 8, at xxix. 
23. K. Guldberg and R. Pilkington, A Community of Practice Approach to the
Development of Non-Traditional Learners Through Networked Learning, 22 J. COMPUTER 
ASSISTED LEARNING 159, 161 (2006). 
24. One example of a shared jargon would be the term “hacker,” which originated at
MIT’s Tech model railroad club, but came to mean a computer “enthusiast, . . . artist, 
tinkerer, [] problem solver, [and] an expert.”  RAYMOND, supra note 17, at xii, 4. 
Computer acronyms, such as “LOL” (laugh out loud), “IMHO” (in my humble opinion), 
and “ROFL” (roll on the floor laughing) also originated as a shared vocabulary within the 
hacker community but have now entered mainstream culture.  See WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LOL (last visited Apr. 7, 2011). 
25. CASTELLS, supra note 8, at 387.
26. CHAYKO, supra note 20, at 3.
27. See JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra note 12, at 18 (explaining how
new media “raise[s] expectations of a freer flow of ideas and content” and inspires 
consumers to participate more fully in their culture.”). 
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engagement, political empowerment, and economic advancement.”28  
New Media theorist Yochai Benkler argues that the new information 
environment has the potential to increase democratic participation 
and ultimately foster a more critical and self-reflective culture.29  It is 
no longer necessary to be affiliated with a powerful industrial or state 
institution in order to disseminate information in a mass format.30  
The decentralization of information production creates more 
opportunities for citizens to perform the watchdog function of society, 
to critique and observe public affairs.31  Thus, the relative ease by 
which information can be disseminated en masse has led to a more 
transparent and malleable culture.32  Participants can be more “self-
reflective and critical of the culture they occupy, thereby enabling 
them to become more self-reflective participants in conversations 
within that culture.”33 
New technology also has the capacity to improve individual 
autonomy. Citizens are now able to “participate in public 
conversation continuously and pervasively, not as passive recipients 
of ‘received wisdom’ from professional talking heads, but as active 
participants in conversations carried out at many levels of political 
and social structure.”34  Moreover, by authoring and disseminating 
narratives based on their own experiences, people can engage in “new 
practices of self-directed agency as a lived experience.”35  Although 
the most optimistic technophile view expressed at the dawn of the 
Internet Age in the 1990s—that the Internet would solve all of the 
world’s social problems—has not come to pass, the Internet has 
nonetheless led to great improvements in our culture, when compared 
to the earlier mass-media driven culture.36 
A final attribute of participatory culture is its immediacy—events 
can be commented upon in realtime as they are unfolding.37  This 
28. Jenkins et al., supra note 12, at 8.
29. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 2.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id. at 11.
32. Id. at 15.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 130.
35. Id. at 137.
36. Although Yochai Benkler dismisses the view that the Internet has wholly
revolutionized the structure of democracy in the public sphere, he maintains that new 
technology has led to a vastly improved information landscape compared to the older 
mass-media model.  See id. at 10, 212–15. 
37. CASTELLS, supra note 8, at 491; see also Andrew Keen, Twitter vs CNN:  Blood
on the Streets, THE TELEGRAPH, (Jun. 23, 2009, 6:01 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk 
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immediacy, enabled by new media communication forms such as 
Twitter and blogs, represents a substantial change from the slower 
paced and highly filtered mass-media information dissemination 
model.  Citizens around the world are now using real-time 
communication devices to stage spontaneous political protests and 
publicize governmental abuses as they occur.38 
In addition to the temporal change in how information is 
disseminated, the Internet also enables public support for an issue to 
build very quickly.39  Internet stories that receive a great amount of 
public interest have the power to demand action from institutions that 
usually move at a much slower pace.  Clay Shirky gives the example 
of Evan Guttman, who, frustrated by the New York City Police 
Department’s refusal to change a report of a phone from missing to 
stolen, turned to the Internet for public support.40  Mr. Guttman 
wrote about his frustration with the NYPD on a website devoted to 
the subject of retrieving the stolen phone.41  Within a matter of days, 
the website generated so much public interest in the phone and the 
police’s handling of the matter that the NYPD changed its course and 
agreed to alter the report.42  Without the Internet’s ability to quickly 
harness public support for his plight, Mr. Guttman would have had to 
resort to more prolonged and possibly futile bureaucratic processes to 
change the police report.43  Thus, in contrast to the time-consuming 
task of requesting action from traditional institutions and 
bureaucracies, new technology can provide a quicker way of getting 
things done.44 
If we accept a technophile view of the Internet, we can say that we 
have an emergent culture that is making our society more open, 
transparent, and egalitarian.  Individuals have more chances to forge 
social connections across long distances that give their lives deeper 
meaning.  Technology has also given individuals more autonomy in 
that they are able to disseminate cultural critiques to mass audiences. 
But what happens when the open ideals of participatory culture 
/technology/5614541/Twitter-vs-CNN-Blood-on-the-streets.html (discussing the view that 
“instantaneous decentralized Twitter [is] the speedy future [of journalism]” and CNN 
represents “the all-too-pedestrian past.”). 
38. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 219; SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 184–87.
39. SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that “a story can go from local to global in a
heartbeat.”). 
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. at 5–6.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 13–14.
44. Id. at 22.
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interact with the more closed system of American legal culture?  We 
are seeing friction between these two worlds with the appearance of 
online, lawyer-penned narratives that offer cynically dark views of the 
practice of law.  The next sections will study these new narratives and 
analyze the professionalism conflicts that they raise. 
III. Online Lawyer Narratives
A. The Online Narrative Format
The Internet has led to a “radical increase in the number of
storytellers and the qualitative diversity of stories told.”45  Users can 
now tell stories across a variety of platforms, through emails, 
threaded posts, online debates, profiles, web log postings, and profile 
descriptions.46  These new narratives play a valuable role in our 
society, leading to new types of communities and more individual 
autonomy.  User stories engender the formation of new communities 
by fostering a collective identity and sense of togetherness.47  In 
addition to the benefits of forming community bonds, online 
narratives also provide a way for individuals, previously silenced 
under mass media information regimes, to comment on their culture.48  
B. New Media Lawyer Narratives
Within the legal profession, the Internet has enabled a new kind
of lawyer-penned narrative stories that function outside the confines 
of the traditional culture of the American legal profession.  Some of 
these stories detail the alienation, exclusionary hierarchy, and lack of 
humanity in the legal job marketplace. Other online lawyer narratives 
expose the hypocritical aspects of a broken criminal justice system 
that insists on deference and respect for judges, even when those 
judges exercise power over criminal defense attorneys and their 
clients in unfair and unjust ways.  Viewed collectively, these new 
narratives portray the practice of law as a dismal enterprise and 
question the traditional wisdom that the legal profession is a “noble 
profession” whose members dispense wisdom from high-level 
45. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 166.
46. CHAYKO, supra note 20, at 31 (positing the view that much of online
communication can be characterized as people sharing narratives and stories). 
47. Id. at 33–34.
48. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 15.
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positions and never have to worry about issues of financial stability.49  
The next three sections will explore these new narratives. 
1. New Media Lawyer Narratives as Tales of Economic Stress and
Alienation
Some emerging new media lawyer stories are viewable as a
reaction to the current economic stresses within the legal profession, 
particularly the alarming trend of law firms cutting jobs; delegating 
low-level legal tasks to temporary “staff attorneys” who are paid by 
the hour and receive no benefits; and outsourcing legal work 
overseas.50 
The dire economic climate coupled with the legal profession’s 
hierarchical elitism has exacerbated the plight of attorneys who 
attend lesser ranked law schools (often borrowing excessive sums of 
money to do so).  As the effects of the Great Recession continue to 
buffet the legal job market, attorneys from the most prestigious 
schools, previously assured a “golden ticket” in terms of a high salary 
at a big firm upon graduation, are facing newfound employment 
challenges.51  Because the legal profession adheres to a rigid 
hierarchical structure when it comes to educational qualifications,52 
the job situation for law graduates at the lower end of the prestige 
ladder is even bleaker.53  The result is that a large number of attorneys 
49. See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1178, 1220 (explaining the traditional understanding
that lawyers are members of a noble profession who impart wisdom, occupy positions of 
power, do good things in society, and never seem to worry about making a living).  See 
also Mashburn, supra note 6, at 668 (explaining that the dominant professional ideology of 
law portrays the lawyer as an aristocratic character who is not to be trifled with monetary 
concerns). 
50. See generally, Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 749
(explaining how recent economic trends are negatively affecting the traditional “big-law” 
firm business model); Marc S. Galanter & William D. Henderson, The Elastic 
Tournament: The Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 
1875–77 (2008) (explaining the trend of big law firms employing staff attorneys and 
outsourcing strategies). 
51. Gerry Shih, Downturn Dims Prospects Even At Top Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/business/26lawyers.html 
(explaining that even graduates from the most elite institutions—such as Yale and NYU—
are having difficulties securing jobs). 
52. See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1181–85 (explaining that law degrees have differing
economic values depending on the perceived prestige of the granting institution). 
53. See Amir Efrati, Hard Case: Job Market Wanes for U.S. Lawyers, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 24, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/ SB11904078678083 
5602.html (explaining the challenges that law graduates with non-elite credentials face in a 
shrinking job market and discussing calls for more accountability in terms of law schools 
reporting employment data concerning their graduates). 
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from lower ranked schools are saddled with high amounts of student 
debt, with no feasible way to pay it off.54 
A host of lawyer blogs such as Temporary Attorney: The 
Sweatshop Edition (“Temporary Attorney”),55 But I Did Everything 
Right,56 Esq. Never,57 Shilling Me Softly,58 and Third Tier Reality59 
expose the negative experiences of attorneys caught up in this system 
of high student debt and limited job opportunities.60  The Third Tier 
Reality blogger posts the following mission statement for his blog: 
My goal is to inform potential law school students and 
applicants of the ugly realities of attending law school.  Do not 
attend unless: (1) You get into a top 8 law school; (2) you get 
a full-tuition scholarship to attend; (3) you have employment 
as an attorney secured through a relative or close friend; or 
(4) you are fully aware beforehand that your huge investment
54. Justin Pope, Analysis: Law Schools Growing, But Jobs Aren’t, LAW.COM, (June
17, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202422330611 (explaining the experience 
of one recent law graduate, who was forced to move back in with his parents as he 
searched for a legal job and struggled to pay off his student debts); Christine Hurt, 
Minding Our Own Business Forum: Bubbles, Student Loans and Sub-Prime Debt, THE 
CONGLOMERATE, (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/04/death-of-big-
law-forum-bubbles-student-loans-and-subprime-debt.html (explaining that the practice of 
investing in a legal education by borrowing heavily is analogous to the sub-prime 
phenomenon in that both schemes rely on the faulty promise that the subject—real estate 
and, in this case, a law degree—would consistently rise in value; the financial situation for 
students attending lower ranked schools is especially dire, given the diminished value of a 
law degree from those schools); Debra Cassens Weiss, 1/3 of Law Students Expect to 
Graduate with 120K in Debt, ABA J., Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com 
/news/article/almost_1_3_of_law_students_expect_to_graduate_with_120k_in_debt (1/3 of 
American law students now expect to graduate with over $120,000 in student debt). 
 55. helpme123, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:  THE SWEATSHOP EDITION, 
http://temporaryattorney .blogspot.com/ (“With over 5,000 daily visitors, help expose the 
nasty sweatshops, swindling law schools, and opportunistic staffing agencies.”) (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2011). 
56. BUT I DID EVERYTHING RIGHT!, http://butidideverythingrightorsoithought
.blogspot.com/ (“Everyday is a cloudy day in the life of a disenchanted lawyer.”) (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2011.) 
57. ESQ. NEVER, http://esqnever.blogspot.com/ (“I’m a 2nd Tier Toilet . . . err, Law
School Graduate who has realized that the law isn’t for me. I’ll be sharing my quest to find 
a successful career in another field while also trying to expose the law school scam.”) (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2011). 
58. SHILLING ME SOFTLY, http://shillingmesoftly.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 8,
2011). 
59. NANDO, THIRD TIER REALITY, http://thirdtierreality.blogspot.com/ (last visited
Apr. 8, 2011). 
60. Ashby Jones, Law Blog, Thinking About Law School? These Blogs Tell You Why
You Shouldn’t,  WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Mar. 29, 2010, 1:58 PM), http://blogs.wsj. 
com/law/2010/03/29/thinking-about-law-school-these-blogs-tells-you-why-you-shouldnt/. 
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in time, energy, and money does not, in any way, guarantee a 
job as an attorney or in the legal industry.61 
The reverse Horatio Alger themes within these blogs render them 
emotionally compelling, but there is also a great bitterness to them. 
The tone of these stories is often sarcastic and irreverent toward their 
subjects. For instance, Temporary Attorney contains a list of “beastly 
behavior awards.”62  These awards are for those who, in the authors’ 
view, perpetuate a system where law students, relying on law school 
marketing materials touting lucrative law careers for its graduates, 
borrow heavily from private lenders to attend law school.63  Upon 
graduation, students find out that their law school’s optimistic tales of 
career success are inaccurate and based on incomplete statistics.64  In 
a series of postings entitled “Profiles in Hypocrisy,” the Third Tier 
Reality blog posts caustic annotations of law schools’ marketing 
materials, commenting on their inaccurate and misleading nature.65 
According to the critiques on these websites, instead of a lucrative 
law career upon licensure, graduates of low-tier law schools, or 
“toilet”66 law schools, encounter a stagnant job market where the only 
61. Nando, THIRD TIER REALITY, supra note 59.
62. See, e.g., helpme123, Open Letter to Dean Richard Slimeball, TEMPORARY 
ATTORNEY: THE SWEATSHOP EDITION, http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com 
/2009/11/open-letter-to-dean-richard-slimeball.html (Nov. 16, 2009, 9:59 AM) [hereinafter 
Dean Richard Slimeball] (Dean Richard Matasar of New York Law School “won” the 
Beastly Behavior award for 2009 for a perceived conflict of interest for serving as 
chairman of the Access Group, a student lending organization, and for serving as the head 
of New York Law School); helpme123, 2007 Beastly Behavior Award: Joan King, 
TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:  THE SWEATSHOP EDITION, http://temporaryattorney.blogspot. 
com/2007/12/2007-beastly-behavior-award-joan-king.html (Dec. 27, 2007, 6:10 PM) 
(Career Services Administrator Joan King, of Brooklyn Law School, “won” the beastly 
behavior award for 2007 for allegedly publicizing optimistic, but incomplete, employment 
data for Brooklyn Law Graduates).  See also, Andrew P. Morriss & William D. 
Henderson, Measuring Outcomes:  Post-Graduation Measures of Success in the U.S. News 
& World Report Law School Rankings, 83 IND. L.J. 791 (2008) (generally critiquing the 
“gaming” strategies that law schools in engage in to maximize post-graduate employment 
data, which in turn affects the schools’ U.S. News and World Report rankings). 
63. See sources cited supra note 62.
64. See sources cited supra note 62.
65. Nando, Profiles in Hypocrisy: TTT Dean Thomas, THIRD TIER REALITY,
http://thirdtierreality.blogspot.com/2010/04/profiles-in-hypocrisy-ttt-dean-thomas.html 
(Apr. 20, 2010, 5:35 AM). 
66. One of the markers of an Internet community is a shared language or new type of
jargon.  See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.  On these websites, the word 
“toilet” and the acronym TTT (third tier toilet) have emerged as terms for law schools 
outside the top two tiers (the top 100 law schools) listed in U.S. News and World Report’s 
annual ranking.  See helpme123, Toilet Law Schools Popping Up, TEMPORARY 
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available work is as a temporary attorney performing monotonous, 
low-level law tasks (such as document review) with no client contact 
and no opportunity to develop one’s legal skills.67  To make matters 
worse, even temporary employment opportunities are shrinking, 
driven in part by large law firms outsourcing this type of routine legal 
work overseas, to places like India.68  Thus, other objects of ire on the 
Temporary Attorney website include law business leaders who 
champion outsourcing as a way for law firms to cut costs and increase 
profits.69 
In addition to leveling harsh criticism for the profit seeking and 
snobbery within the legal profession and legal education, these 
websites provide an alternative narrative space for lawyers to share 
their stories.  For instance, through the posting and comment 
functions on Temporary Attorney: The Sweatshop Edition, 
anonymous temporary attorney bloggers exchange reports of 
reviewing documents on computer screens for sixteen hours a day in 
poorly ventilated, cockroach-infested basements.70  Workers must 
obtain permission to use the bathroom and are not allowed to leave 
the premises to, for instance, walk outside to get a cup of coffee, 
unless it is during the forty-five minute lunch time allocation.71  
Female attorney workers report being assaulted by other workers, yet 
are too afraid to report the assault for fear of losing the job.72 
ATTORNEY:  THE SWEATSHOP EDITION, http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com/2008/06/ 
toilet-law-schools-popping-up.html (June 12, 2008, 3:24 PM). 
67. See Arin Greenwood, Attorney at Blah, WASH. CITY PAPER, Nov. 19, 2007,
available at http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/display.php?id=34054. 
68. See Arin Greenwood, Manhattan Work at Mumbai Prices: Inside India’s Hottest
Legal Outsourcing Firm, 93 A.B.A. J. 36, 40 (2007), available at http://abajournal. 
com/magazine/manhattan_work_at_mumbai_prices/; Daniel Brook, Made in India: Are 
Your Lawyers In New York or New Delhi, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May/June 2005, available at 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2005/scene_brook_ mayjun05.msp. 
69. See helpme123, Beastly Behavior Award: David Perla, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:
THE SWEATSHOP EDITION (Dec. 30, 2008, 2:46 PM), http://temporaryattorney. 
blogspot.com/2008/12/2008-beastly-behavior-award-david-perla.html (awarding David 
Perla, CEO of outsourcing firm Pangea3, the website’s beastly behavior award in 2008). 
70. Julie Triedman, Slaves of New York, THE AM. LAWYER, Mar. 2006, at 19.
71. See id. See also helpme123, The “Update Legal” Shearman and Sterling Project,
TEMPORARY ATTORNEY: THE SWEATSHOP EDITION (Jan. 28, 2008, 12:16 AM), 
http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com/2008/01/update-legal-shearman-sterling-project. 
html (detailing the work requirements for a document review job at New York law firm 
Shearman and Sterling). 
72. helpme123, Another Assault at LabaToilet?, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY: THE 
SWEATSHOP EDITION (Mar. 24, 2010, 3:29 PM), http://temporaryattorney.blogspot. 
com/2010/03/another-assault-at-labatoilet.html  (“I quit labaton several weeks ago after I 
too was assaulted in front of several witnesses in the eating area and no one 
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The posts and comments on Temporary Attorney are often ugly 
and sometimes contain negative racial stereotypes about the 
perceived behavioral traits of various staff attorneys.  The anonymity 
of the blog forum also makes determining the truth of the posts 
difficult.  Nonetheless, there are some instances of the blog’s 
comments function, which allows users to question the accuracy of a 
particular post, serving as a type of peer-review that maintains the 
integrity of the forum.73  Despite the hostile and often corrosive 
nature of the forum, Temporary Attorney provides attorneys working 
in this realm with a place to vent, to feel connected, and to share 
similar experiences of alienation and isolation.  Thus, these “new” 
websites have opened up spaces that did not previously exist within 
the profession’s traditional confines: a public forum for attorney 
criticism and a community gathering place. 
2. Viral Lawyer Emails
Lawyer narratives, in the form of viral74 emails that receive a wide
audience by virtue of the ease with which an email can be forwarded 
across cyberspace, are also challenging and critiquing the traditional 
culture of the legal profession. The first widely circulated viral email 
of this type originated from an associate at the venerable Cadwalader, 
Wickersham & Taft law firm in 2001.75  In a farewell email of sorts 
confronted/reported the asshole who hit me to anyone, including me because we were all 
afraid of losing our jobs, just as happened to other people recently.”). 
73. For instance, the posting about the woman being assaulted at a document review
project was questioned in several comments. See Comments to helpme123, Another 
Assault at LabaToilet?, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY: THE SWEATSHOP EDITION, http:// 
temporaryattorney.blogspot.com/2010/03/another-assault-at-labatoilet.html (Mar. 24, 
2010, 3:29 PM).  Yochai Benker refers to this process of accuracy questioning, played out 
within the comments section of a blog, as peer accreditation.  BENKLER, supra note 7, at 
76–80 (explaining how peer accreditation works on Slashdot, a user moderated technology 
news website). 
74. For an explanation of the viral concept as applied to the Internet, see supra note 9
and surrounding text.  Neal Stephenson’s novel Snow Crash affords the best explanation 
of the viral concept within new media culture: 
We are all susceptible to the pull of viral ideas. Like mass hysteria. Or a tune 
that gets into your head that you keep on humming all day until you spread 
it to someone else. Jokes. Urban legends. Crackpot religions. Marxism. No 
matter how smart we get, there is always this deep irrational part that makes 
us potential hosts for self-replicating information. 
NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH 399–400 (1992). 
75. See Ben McGrath, Oops, THE NEW YORKER, June 30, 2003, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/06/30/030630ta_talk_mcgrath (identifying this 
email as “2001’s most celebrated legal e-mail.”).  Although the email was widely circulated 
in 2001, it has mostly disappeared from cyberspace, but its text is still available at 
autoadmit.com, a forum for prospective and current law students.  See posting of h4ck3d 
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sent to the entire firm, the author wrote of his perception that he was 
let go from his summer associate job because he asked for time off to 
take care of his ailing mother and because he spent time at a firm 
function inquiring about his sick daughter on his cell phone.76  Lashing 
out at the firm’s white shoe culture, the author asked if he was fired 
because he “would not eat lobster tails because [he] called them giant 
cockroaches” or because of his Italian-American heritage.  Although 
poorly written and executed, the email nonetheless expressed the 
sentiment of a disappointed future lawyer who felt excluded by the 
culture of a big law firm and alienated by its lack of humanity. 
On May 5, 2008, Paul Hastings associate Shinyung Oh sent a mass 
email concerning the termination of her employment.77  The email 
was re-posted on blogs and eventually made its way to the Wall Street 
Journal’s Law Blog, which interviewed her about the email.78  In the 
email, Oh explained how she was terminated just six days after having 
a miscarriage.  She recounted that just days before her termination, a 
female partner simply sat stone-faced while Oh broke down in tears 
thinking about her miscarriage.79  Oh wrote: “[w]e are human beings 
first before we are partners or associates.” 
Oh also questioned the firm’s reasoning for her termination, 
based on a single negative performance review, when one week prior, 
a partner had told her that her work was “great” and that the slow 
business in no way affected her performance.80  “What I do not 
understand is the attempt to blame the associate for not bringing in 
the business that should have been brought in by each of you and to 
hide your personal failures by attempting to tarnish my excellent 
performance record and looking to undermine my sense of self-
esteem.”81  Oh was commenting on the large law firm practice of 
making “stealth layoffs,” which justify personnel decisions in terms of 
4cc0unt, AUTOADMIT.COM (Feb. 23, 2005, 5:01 AM), http://www.xoxohth.com/thread. 
php?thread_id=140158 &mc=140&forum_id=2. 
76. Id.
77. The email was picked up and reposted on the popular Above the Law blog.  See
David Lat, Breaking: A Dramatic Farewell (and Proof of Paul Hastings Layoffs), ABOVE 
THE LAW (May 5, 2008, 3:48 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2008/05/breaking-a-dramatic-
farewell-emailand-proof-of-paul-hastings-layoffs-/. 
78. Amir Efrati, Law Blog, Fired Paul Hastings Associate Talks to Law Blog, WALL
ST. J. (May 8, 2008, 9:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/05/08/fired-paul-hastings-
associate-talks-to-law-blog/. 
79. Lat, supra note 77.  Ms. Oh further wrote: “[E]ven a few words of sympathy or
concern would have made a world of difference.  What kind of people squander human 
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an attorney’s objective performance,82 a practice that ignores the 
possibility that the large firm’s outdated structure, combined with 
contemporary market forces, is what drives attorney layoffs.83 
When the Wall Street Journal’s Law Blog interviewed her, Oh 
explained that she wrote the email because she “didn’t want other 
associates who may be laid off because of downsizing by the firm—
but told it is because of their performance—to doubt their own 
abilities.”84  This example shows the power, inherent within New 
Media, for one person’s critique of a powerful legal institution to 
make its way to a mass audience.  Although it may not have affected 
the stealth layoff practices of the large law firms, the email did 
succeed as a comment on the great unfairness of the practice.  It also 
probably helped other attorneys caught in a similar bind to feel less 
alienated. 
3. New Media Lawyer Narratives as Critiques of a Broken Criminal
Defense Culture
Online, we have also seen criminal defense lawyers lashing out at
a hostile “judge-centered” culture where prosecutors and judges 
employ systemic strategies to encourage defendants to make plea 
bargains or waive other rights in an effort to lighten a judge’s docket 
or prosecutor’s caseload.85  In a criminal justice system that is 
notoriously overloaded and understaffed, this ingrained culture seeks 
to make the lives of the judges and prosecutors, and sometimes even 
the beleaguered criminal defense attorneys, more manageable.86  
82. Law Shucks, More Hypocrisy in Stealth Layoffs, LAW SHUCKS, (Feb. 6, 2009),
http://lawshucks.com/2009/02/06/more-hypocrisy-in-stealth-layoffs/ (explaining the pheno-
menon of “stealth layoffs,” which occurs “when firms lay off attorneys supposedly for 
performance reasons, but in fact are doing so by imposing arbitrarily tighter standards due 
to economic conditions.”).  See also, David Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So 
Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 
493, 533-34 (1996) (explaining that law firms are incentivized to portray associate layoffs in 
terms of objective performance rather than as a result of market forces). 
83. See Ribstein, supra note 50 (explaining the current shrinkage of large law firms as
the product of an outdated firm structure and current market forces). 
84. Efrati, supra note 78.
85. See Jonathan Rapping, You Can’t Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the
Foundation for Indigent Defense Reform Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training and 
Mentoring, 3 HARV. LAW AND POL’Y REV. 161, 162–63 (2009); John Henry Schlegel, But 
Pierre, If We Can’t Think Normatively, What Are We To Do? 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 955, 
965–66 (2003) (describing criminal defense bar as a culture that emphasizes efficient 
resolution of cases that discourages defense attorneys from zealously advocating on behalf 
of their clients). 
86. See Rapping, supra note 85, at 162–63, 166–67.
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However, the culture operates at the expense of the defendant, who 
often receives the short end of the stick.87 
On Tuesday, October 30, 2006, defense attorney Sean Conway 
blogged about his frustration with a Fort Lauderdale judge’s practice 
of giving defense attorneys the choice of a too-short period in which 
to prepare for a trial or asking for a continuance and consequently 
waiving the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.88  Conway posted that 
his understanding of the relevant criminal procedure rule was that 
defendants and their attorneys must receive a reasonable amount of 
time to prepare for trial, calculated from the date a guilty plea is 
entered.89  However, in calculating the trial preparation time period, 
the judge Conway was appearing before used the date the attorney 
was appointed to the defendant, a later date that left Conway with an 
insufficient amount of time in which to prepare for trial.90  Using 
colorful and irreverent language (perhaps because Halloween was the 
next day), Conway called the judge an “Evil, Unfair Witch,” stated 
that she had an “ugly, condescending attitude,” that she was “unfit for 
her position,” and that she was “seemingly mentally ill.”91 
On the basis of this blog post, in April of 2007, the State Bar of 
Florida initiated disciplinary proceedings against Conway, asserting 
that he violated various rules, including Florida Bar Rule 4-8.2(a), 
which prohibits attorneys from making a statement that the lawyer 
“knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity 
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . ”92 and Florida 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(d), which prohibits attorneys from “engaging in 
87. See id.
88. Sean Conway, Judge Aleman’s new (illegal) “One-week to prepare” policy,
JAABLOG (Oct. 30, 2006, 9:11 PM), http://jaablog.jaablaw.com/2006/10/30/judge-alemans-
new-illegal-oneweek-to-prepare-policy.aspx.  See also Letter from the Florida Bar to Sean 
William Conway 2 (Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/cit 
medialaw.org/files/2007-04-03-Letter%20Notifying%20Conway%20of%20Bar%20Invest 
igation.pdf; John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13lawyers.html. 
89. Conway, supra note 88.
90. Id.
91. Id.  The subject of Conway’s post, Judge Cheryl Aleman, was reprimanded by the
Florida Supreme Court in a separate incident for engaging in “arrogant, discourteous, and 
impatient” behavior with lawyers. John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules 
of the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
09/13/us/13lawyers.html. 
92. FLA. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 4-8.2(a) (2010).  This rule is identical to
MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.2(a) (1983). 
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conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to 
the administration of justice.”93 
After a referee’s report was issued that recommended discipline 
for Conway, the parties agreed to resolve the case through a 
conditional guilty plea for consent judgment, in which Conway 
admitted to making improper derogatory remarks about a judge.94  
Before the Florida Supreme Court approved the plea, however, it 
directed the parties to brief the issue of whether the First 
Amendment protected any of Conway’s remarks.95  In response, both 
parties filed briefs, along with the ACLU of Florida, which submitted 
an amicus brief arguing against imposing discipline on Conway.96 
On October 29, 2008, the Florida Supreme Court approved the 
conditional plea, directing that Conway receive a public reprimand 
and pay costs in the amount of $1,250.00.97  Because the Court 
approved the discipline of Conway without a written opinion, we do 
not know what its precise reasoning was.98  However, it appears that 
the Court followed its prior precedent and applied an objective 
“reasonable attorney” standard in evaluating lawyer violations of 
Florida Bar Rule 4-8.2(a),99 as opposed to the more expansive “actual 
malice” subjective standard used in nonlawyer libel cases involving 
public figures.100  Under the objective standard, an attorney can be 
disciplined for statements about judges if, viewed from the standpoint 
of a reasonable attorney, he or she did not have “an objectively 
reasonable factual basis for making the statements.”101  The subjective 
“actual malice” approach would look to the actual mindset of the 
attorney and would not impose discipline unless he/she made the 
statements knowing they were false or with a reckless disregard as to 
93. FLA. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 4-8.4(d) (2010).  This rule is identical to
MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4(d) (1983). 
94. Brief of Complainant at 2, Fla. Bar v. Conway, 996 So. 2d. 213 (Fla. 2008) No.
SC08-326 [hereinafter Brief of Complainant, Fla. Bar v. Conway]. 
95. See id.  See also Fla. Bar v. Conway, No. SC08-326, docket entry for June 23, 2008.
96. See Fla. Bar v. Conway, No. SC08-326, docket entry for July 14, 2008.
97. Fla. Bar v. Conway, 2008 WL 4748577, *1 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2008).
98. Obtaining clarity on the Court’s reasoning is further hampered by the fact that
Conway signed a plea agreement, admitting that his comments about the judge were 
improper and a rules violation. See Brief of Complainant, Fla. Bar v. Conway, supra note 
94, at 2. 
99. Id. at 6–8 (citing Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 558–59 (Fla. 2001)).
100. Brief of Complainant, Fla. Bar v. Conway, supra note 94, at 7 (citing New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). 
101. Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 559 (Fla. 2001).
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their truth.102  The Florida Supreme Court also appears to have 
rejected the argument that Conway’s comments were not actionable 
because they were opinions rather than facts capable of being proven 
true or false.103 
In writing his blog post, Sean Conway believed that he was 
alerting other defense attorneys within his community to the unfair 
and prejudicial practices of a publicly elected judge.104  In response to 
the disciplinary complaint against him, he wrote the following in his 
letter to the Florida Bar: 
The article . . . [informs] all defense attorneys, as well as 
prosecutors, of Judge Aleman’s violation of Rule 3.160 of the 
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Defendants depend on 
defense attorneys to zealously defend their rights.  With 
people’s liberty at stake, it is critical to point out Judge 
Aleman’s illegal behavior to other defense attorneys and 
prosecutors.105 
At the end of its Brief to the Florida Supreme Court, the Florida 
State Bar asserts that it is acceptable to silence lawyer criticism of the 
legal profession because of the important interest of upholding the 
integrity of the bar: 
Neither the law nor the profession should lose sight of the 
obligation of every lawyer to conduct himself in a manner 
which will cause laymen, and the public generally, to have the 
highest respect for and confidence in members of the legal 
profession.  When a lawyer commits any act or conducts 
himself in such fashion as to cause criticism of the Bar, he 
thereby impairs the confidence and respect which the Bar 
102. See, e.g., Matter of Green, 11 P.3d 1078, 1084 (Colo. 2000); Okla. Bar Ass’n v.
Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 969 (Okla. 1988); Ramsey v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 771 S.W.2d 
116, 121–22 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989). 
103. Brief of Complainant, Fla. Bar v. Conway, supra note 88, at 10 (citing In re
Nathan, 671 N.W.2d 578, 584 (Minn. 2003)) (“Merely cloaking an assertion of fact as an 
opinion does not give the assertion constitutional protection.”).  On the other hand, the 
one circuit court case on point, Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, held that if 
an attorney’s remark is an opinion, then the First Amendment protects the speech.  55 
F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995).
104. Letter from Sean Christopher Conway to Alan Anthony Pascal, Bar Counsel, in
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generally should enjoy in the eyes of the public . . . Without 
the respect and confidence of the public, it is impossible for 
the profession to discharge its duties effectively and 
efficiently, which duties are graver now than ever before in 
history.106 
The sentiment expressed in the above quote assumes that the 
legal profession is in good working order.  In contrast to such an 
assumption, Conway’s blog posting points to deep structural 
problems within the legal profession.  Conway was not just criticizing 
a judge, but an entire institutional culture that bends the rights of 
criminal defendants in order to promote efficient docket management 
practices.107  That he called this judge an evil, unfair witch may have 
been ill-advised, but these words reflect the opinion of a highly 
frustrated lawyer operating within a broken criminal justice system. 
The Conway case is one of the first cases where participatory 
culture, mirroring the ideals that underlie the First Amendment, has 
clashed with professional disciplinary rules, but more such cases are 
likely forthcoming.  In her comprehensive analysis of the First 
Amendment rights of attorneys who, like Conway, are critical of the 
judiciary, Margaret Tarkington convincingly argues why the approach 
of broadly imposing discipline for attorney speech is wrong from the 
standpoint of both Supreme Court precedent and the policies that 
underlie the First Amendment.108  Tarkington’s thesis is that attorney 
speech critical of the judiciary should be protected because it is, at its 
heart, political speech about governmental officials.109  That a lawyer’s 
speech about judges is core political speech gains even more credence 
when we consider that thirty-nine states elect members of their 
judiciary, either initially or by retention elections.110  Following this 
line of argument, the Conway decision runs contrary to the principles 
that underlie the First Amendment, namely that free speech 
engenders participatory democracy and serves as a check against 
government oppression.111 
106. Brief of Complainant, Fla. Bar v. Sean William Conway, supra note 94, at 19
(quoting Fla. Bar v. Wagner, 212 So. 2d 770, 772–73 (Fla. 1968)). 
107. See Rapping, supra note 85, at 162–63, 166–67.
108. Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney
Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567 (2009). 
109. Id. at 1575.
110. Id. at 1577.
111. Id. at 1575–76 (citing Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is Absolute,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255 (1961) (discussing the idea that free speech provides the 
means for democratic self-governance)); id. at 1579–80 (citing Vincent Blasi, The Checking 
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The democratic ideals that underlie both the First Amendment 
and participatory culture would be better served by applying the 
subjective “actual malice” standard derived from New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan,112 which would analyze the attorney’s individual 
mindset concerning the truth or falsity of his or her statement.113  The 
objective standard, accepted by the majority of U.S. courts, is 
unworkable because it allows members of the judiciary (the subjects 
of the criticism) to decide as a matter of law what is reasonable 
criticism.114  This approach enshrines a traditional view of what it 
means to be a professional, leaving no room for lawyers in the 
minority who may have a differing view of what is “reasonable” in a 
professional context. 
It would also be advisable to impose narrow limits on the type of 
attorney speech that would be subject to discipline.  For instance, in 
Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, the Ninth Circuit held 
that attorneys would be free to voice their opinions about judicial 
officers, even if those opinions are critical, harsh, and disrespectful.115  
Thus, Conway’s comment of the judge being an “Evil, Unfair Witch,” 
was his opinion rather than a literal false statement of fact, and would 
not be grounds for attorney discipline.116  Unfortunately, however, 
most courts decline to follow Yagman and dismiss the fact/opinion 
issue as a “false dichotomy” and impose discipline whenever there is 
an insult to the court.117 
A narrow rule imposing discipline for specific factual statements 
would uphold professional standards by preventing attorneys from 
Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) (discussing 
the other core ideal within the First Amendment, as providing a “checking-value” against 
the abuse of power by public officials)). 
112. 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1960).
113. Only three states have adopted the subjective Sullivan standard for evaluating
attorney speech critical of the judiciary.  See Matter of Green, 11 P.3d 1078, 1084 (Colo. 
2000); Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 969 (Okla. 1988); Ramsey v. Bd. of Prof’l 
Responsibility, 771 S.W.2d 116, 121–22 (Tenn. 1989). 
114. See Tarkington, supra note 108, at 1590, 1607.  The problem is that in these
proceedings, “[t]he Court acts as judge, jury, and appellate reviewer in a disciplinary 
proceeding.”  Id. at 1607 (quoting In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d 714, 720–21 (Ind. 2002) (per 
curiam) (Boehm, J., dissenting), modified, 782 N.E.2d 985, 987 (Ind. 2003). 
115. 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990)).
116. See id.
117. See Steven Wisotsky, Incivility and Unprofessionalism on Appeal: Impugning the
Integrity of Judges, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 303, 304–05 (2005) (citing In re Westfall, 808 
S.W.2d 829, 832 (Mo. 1991)). 
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uttering bald-faced lies.118  However, attorneys would be free to voice 
criticism in the form of opinions, rhetorical hyperbole, name-calling, 
and subjective theories.119  Protecting an attorney’s right to express his 
or her critical opinions and theories about the judiciary is the right 
approach because it would support a robust, though sometimes 
distasteful, discourse that ultimately leads to more transparency and 
accountability within the judiciary. 
Moreover, the accepted rationale for restricting attorney speech—
that an attorney’s criticism damages public faith in the legal system 
(of which the judiciary is a part)120—is not a strong enough reason to 
engage in wholesale censorship.  First, as recognized by the Supreme 
Court, the proffered fear that the judicial system would fall apart 
from untrammeled criticism is generally unfounded and based on 
mere conjecture.121  Second, at its essence, this theory allows one 
branch of the government to silence criticism about itself in order to 
protect its reputation—exactly the type of authoritarian behavior the 
First Amendment was meant to curb.122 
As I will explain more deeply in the next section, the outcome in 
the Conway case is also harmful from a professional culture 
standpoint because it silences critical outsider voices.  When we 
ignore alternative viewpoints from within the profession, we are 
reinforcing the harmful and hierarchical strains within our culture and 
privileging an elite, non-pluralistic view of what it means to be a 
lawyer.  We should not elevate concerns over the integrity of the bar 
and the legal profession above an individual’s words,123 albeit 
disrespectful words, that make a structural or institutional critique. 
IV. The Cultural Value of Critical Online Lawyer Narratives.
One might ask, why should we care that some disgruntled lawyers
have taken to online whining about their unhappiness with the legal 
118. It would also be appropriate to discipline attorneys whose speech poses a
“substantial likelihood” of materially prejudicing a pending proceeding.  See, e.g., 
Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1442; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RS. 3.5 (prohibiting 
conduct that is disruptive to a tribunal), 3.6 (prohibiting trial publicity that has a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a pending proceeding). 
119. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438, 1440–41. The First Amendment protects opinion-
based speech because there is less danger that members of the public would take such 
statements at face value.  See id. at 1439. 
120. Tarkington, supra note 108, at 1630–31 (quoting Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437).
121. Id. at 1637 (citing Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Va., 493 U.S. 829, 841 (1979)).
122. See id. at 1632–33.
123. When questioned as to why he blogged about the judge, Conway replied that he
felt that “[a]ll I had left were my words.”  Schwartz, supra note 88. 
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profession?  In terms of the cultural value that these digital stories 
bring to the table, there are two reasons why we should care.  The 
first reason has to do with the value that the narrative form, in 
particular, brings to our understanding of the legal profession. 
Narrative information in a digital format, such as blogs and emails, 
have been identified as a new kind of literature, like the novel in 
some ways, but ultimately breaking new ground with a new, more 
interactive and sharable format.124  Scholars have long argued that we 
can learn much from narrative perspectives from literature and film 
that depict life in the law.125  Richard Weisberg, outlining the history 
of the law and literature movement, writes that law narratives provide 
the “best source (outside of ourselves) of sense and sensibility.”126  
Law and literature pioneer James Elkins similarly writes that “[a] 
narrative perspective is the kind of seeing that places its characters in 
a world that extends beyond what I, a solitary mind, can imagine.”127  
Thus, these blog postings and emails, viewable as a new kind of 
lawyer narrative, bring value to the profession by offering a different 
perspective on the practice of law outside of a traditionalist and 
formalist framework. 
Second, these messages are penned by lawyers who, for some 
reason or another, exist outside of the wood-paneled offices where 
legal meaning is traditionally made in our profession.  Because these 
lawyers exist outside the elite levels of the profession, they can be 
considered “outsider” attorneys, in the same way that critical 
theorists use that term to designate minority individuals who do not 
124. See Steve Himmer, The Labyrinth Unwound: Weblogs as Literature, INTO THE
BLOGOSPHERE (2004) http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/labyrinth_unbound.html 
(arguing that the web log form is a “distinct literary form” that shares many narrative 
attributes with the novel); Laura J. Gurak & Smiljana Antonijevic, Digital Rhetoric and 
Public Discourse, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF RHETORICAL STUDIES (Lundsford, ed., 
2009) and LAURA GURAK, PERSUASION AND PRIVACY IN CYBERSPACE 61–62 (1997) 
(situating email messages within concept of digital rhetoric). 
125. See e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers:
Lawyering in Literature, Narratives, Film and Television, and Ethical Choices Regarding 
Career and Craft, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (arguing that literature and film 
depictions of lawyers function as an important reflection upon the ethics and morality of 
lawyering); Lance McMillian, Tortured Souls: Unhappy Lawyers Viewed Through the 
Medium of Film, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 31, 34 (2009) (positing that we have 
much to learn from “the portrayal of tortured attorneys through the medium of film.”). 
126. Richard Weisberg, Coming of Age Some More:  “Law and Literature” Beyond the
Cradle, 13 NOVA L. REV. 107, 110 (1989). 
127. James R. Elkins, The Stories We Tell Ourselves in Law, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 53
(1990). 
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fit into mainstream or majority culture.128  Carrie Menkel-Meadow 
argues that “we learn so much more by including new perspectives 
and new knowers who are beginning to find their voices.”129  For 
instance, an outsider voice can innovate within the formal legal 
system, imagining new causes of action, new legal categories, and 
new, less litigious ways of lawyering such as alternative dispute 
resolution.130 
Thus, the narrative approach and the unique perspective that 
informs these messages bring value to our understanding of what it 
means to be a lawyer in the twenty-first century.  We no longer live in 
a world where the gentlemanly small-town lawyer model applies to 
everyone.  We now have a class of lawyers writing about experiences 
that differ vastly from the previously existing stories about the elite 
lawyers predominant in our popular culture, such as the Harvard Law 
School of Paper Chase131 and One-L132 fame or the large law firm 
culture portrayed by Louis Auchincloss in Diary of a Yuppie133 and 
William Keates’ in Proceed with Caution.134  Moreover, these new 
online lawyer authors—jobless, ridden with debt, and struggling to 
make a living in a hostile profession—are experiencing the practice of 
law that contrasts mightily with another commonplace lawyer motif, 
the lawyer as heroic figure advancing a just cause in society.135  These 
lawyers are not fighting public injustice or even discussing the soulless 
128. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
1258, 1261–65 (1992) (categorizing African Americans, Mexicans, Native Americans, and 
Asians as “outsiders” within popular culture). 
129. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29, 35 (1988). 
130. Id. at 35–50. Menkel-Meadow writes about the impact that feminist voices have
had in the legal system. 
131. JOHN OSBOURNE, THE PAPER CHASE (1971) (fictional account of Harvard Law
School in the late 1960s and early 1970s that aptly captures the terrifying elements of the 
Socratic method through the book’s Professor Kingsfield character, who was later played 
by John Houseman in the Paper Chase movie and television series). 
132. SCOTT TURROW, ONE L (1977) (Turrow’s memoir of his first year at Harvard
Law School that recounts the cutthroat competition, frustration, and the ultimate 
intellectual rewards that came to him at the year’s completion). 
133. LOUIS AUCHINCLOSS, DIARY OF A YUPPIE (1986) (short novel about a young
associate structuring corporate takeover deals at a large New York City law firm during 
the “me” decade (the 1980s)). 
134. WILLIAM R. KEATES, PROCEED WITH CAUTION: A DIARY OF THE FIRST YEAR 
AT ONE OF AMERICA’S LARGEST, MOST PRESTIGIOUS LAW FIRMS (1997) (nonfiction 
account of the stressful and demanding life of a highly paid associate at a large New York 
City law firm). 
135. The obvious example of a heroic lawyer model would be Atticus Finch.  HARPER 
LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). 
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but lucrative life of a big law firm associate; rather, they report on the 
daily injustices inflicted upon them on a very microlevel.  They are, 
for instance, berated by hostile judges or spend their workday 
reviewing documents on a screen and entering codes on a keyboard, 
over and over again.  The perspectives that inform these new online 
lawyer narratives are culturally valuable because they provide a 
competing view, albeit a dark and sometimes mundane one, of 
lawyering in America today. 
V. Professionalism Issues
The narratives described above do not paint a pretty picture of 
law practice.  For instance, many of the websites often juxtapose 
images of pigs with posts about the actions of the ABA or large law 
firms.136  Another favorite visual rhetoric device is to juxtapose an 
image of a filthy toilet in connection with a post pointing out the 
inaccuracies in the marketing materials employed by a lower tier 
“toilet” law school.137  It is also common to see vicious character 
attacks on persons in positions of power perceived to be responsible 
for some of the problems within the legal profession.138  However, the 
recurring theme within these narratives is that there are lawyers, 
outside of the elite legal institutions, who believe that the legal 
profession is broken and feel betrayed by the dichotomy between the 
law profession’s ideals, usually expressed in terms of liberal 
humanism, and the harsh reality of practicing law in an alienating and 
unrewarding environment. 
Because these new narratives are often bitter, sarcastic, and 
highly critical of the bar, the first reaction of most lawyers would be 
to recoil in disgust, brand the authors as unethical or 
unprofessional,139 or reject them as having a “sour grapes” minority 
136. See Nando, ABA Pigs at a Trough, THIRD TIER REALITY (Apr. 1, 2010, 3:58
AM) http://thirdtierreality.blogspot.com/2010/04/aba-pigs-at-trough-law-school-is-poor.
html (using a photograph of pigs in conjunction with a post on the ABA); helpme123, 2009
Most Profitable Year Ever for the Paul Weiss Slave Drivers, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:
THE SWEATSHOP EDITION (Feb. 1, 2010, 5:10 PM) http://temporaryattorney.
blogspot.com/2010/02/2009-most-profitable-year-ever-for-paul.html (using imagery of pigs
in conjunction with a post on large law firm Paul Weiss).
137. See Nando, Call the Plumber: Seton Hall University School of Law, THIRD TIER
REALITY (Apr. 8, 2010, 4:11 AM), http://thirdtierreality.blogspot.com/2010/04/call-
plumber-seton-hall-university.html. 
138. See, e.g., supra notes 65, 70, and accompanying text.
139. The term “professional” represents a higher, normative concept that looks at
what attorneys should do as opposed to what they must do, which is the province of the 
ethics rules.  See Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, The Rules, and Professionalism: The 
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view of the profession and not worthy of further thought.140  However, 
there are at least three reasons why it would be a mistake to discipline 
these authors or dismiss their stories as a minority view of the 
profession. 
The first two reasons involve a critical reconsideration of two 
doctrines that inform our professional identity: the ideology of liberal 
humanism and the profession’s codified ethics rules and underlying 
norms.  First, like most democratic institutions, the legal profession is 
founded upon liberal ideals of human autonomy and dignity. 
However, in the law profession, institutions and organizations (such 
as law firms and law schools) operate in a capitalistic and hierarchical 
environment and can actually restrict human dignity and autonomy. 
Nonetheless, traditional professional discourse leaves little room for 
criticizing the deep institutional structures of our profession.  When 
Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical 
Approaches of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 440–41 (2005) (discussing how “ethics” 
has become synonymous with the minimum rules governing attorney conduct whereas 
“professionalism” embodies a more normative standard as to what lawyers “should” do); 
Jeffrey A. Maine, Importance of Ethics and Morality in Today’s Legal World, 29 STETSON 
L. REV. 1073, 1077–78 (2000) (explaining that disciplinary rules such as the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct contain the minimum ethical standards whereas true
professionalism requires one to go beyond the bounds of the disciplinary rules).
As the example of Sean Conway shows, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(a) (as
adopted in most states, including Florida) provides a strong basis for imposing attorney
discipline for negative stories about judges.  A few states have professional rules that
support discipline for more general criticism of the profession.  In Illinois, for instance,
attorneys may be disciplined for conduct that brings “the courts or the legal profession
into disrepute.”  See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 770.  Additional authority for disciplining
attorneys for general critiques of the legal system can be found in the preamble to the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which exhorts lawyers to “respect the legal
system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers, and public officials.”
See Steven Wisotsky, Incivility and Unprofessionalism on Appeal:  Impugning the Integrity
of Judges, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 303, 309, n.34 (2005) (citing 5-H Corp. v. Padovano,
708 So. 2d 244, 245–46, 248 (Fla. 1997)).  See also, Preamble, ¶ 6, MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT (2002) (“A lawyer should further the public’s understanding of and
confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a
constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their
authority.”).  Outside the context of criticizing judges or prejudicing an ongoing trial, the
case law does not generally support the idea of imposing attorney discipline for broad-
based critiques of the legal system.  Such criticism would, however, violate the implicit
professional norms that underlie the ethics rules.  See infra notes 152–54 and
accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Knut, All You Need to Know About the “Scam-Blogs”: An Evolution
and a Guide for New Readers, FIRST TIER TOILET (Jan. 11, 2011), http://firsttiertoilet. 
blogspot.com/2011/01/all-you-need-to-know-about-scam-blogs.html (explaining that in the 
first few years of the anti-law school scamblogging movement, “[a]nyone who dared to 
raised [sic] his voice about the serious problems in legal education and legal employment 
would be viciously insulted as an embittered loser.”). 
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viewed from this critical standpoint, online critical lawyer narratives 
are doing more than just expressing bitter dissatisfaction with the 
profession; they are attacking the very substrates on which the 
profession stands.  This necessary and valuable criticism may help the 
profession evolve away from the elitism and mercenary profit seeking 
that seem to plague the culture.  Second, to the extent that ethics 
rules or professionalism norms can be used to silence critical lawyers, 
we should question the premises that underlie these rules.  What are 
these rules meant to protect and what assumptions are they based on? 
Perhaps the rules should be reconsidered if they fail to account for 
the values of a plurality of the profession. 
The third reason that critical online lawyer forums should be 
allowed to thrive is because they provide important community and 
therapeutic benefits.  With the Internet, non elite lawyers now have a 
valuable community space to commiserate, express dissent, and 
formulate critiques that could lead to positive change.  I will discuss 
these three inquiries in turn.  In the last part of this section, I will 
consider potential arguments against the legal profession embracing 
participatory culture. 
A. Critical Lawyer Narratives as a Structural Critique
Online lawyer narratives provide a compelling structural141
critique of the liberal humanism (or liberal individualism) that 
informs much of the legal culture in America, including our 
professional ideals.142  Liberal humanism exalts notions of human 
liberty and agency but also requires adherence to capitalistic and 
141. As a sociological perspective, structuralism has many academic variations but all
of them are generally concerned with studying the organizational forms that emerge from 
human interactions.  See Bruce H. Mayhew, Structuralism v. Individualism: Part 1, 
Shadowboxing in the Dark, 59 SOCIAL FORCES 335, 335–39 (1980).  Structuralists are 
concerned with “identifying deeper, underlying . . . patterns that find expression in surface 
level cultural forms.”  John W. Mohr, Introduction: Structures, Institutions, and Cultural 
Analysis, 27 POETICS 57, 57 (2000). Susan Carle uses the term structural to refer to how 
social structures determine inequalities of power and resources that can in turn affect how 
lawyers approach advocacy for their clients.  Susan Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 101, 114–16 (2008). 
142. In general, the law uses themes of equality and objectivity (liberal humanism
ideals) to foster the ideas that social outcomes are the fair result of neutral processes 
rather than the result of preexisting inequalities.  See MERTZ, supra note 4, at 4-6, 212–14 
(explaining the process by which the law employs abstract and formalistic legal reasoning, 
which emphasizes procedure and precedent, at the expense of social context and moral 
issues); Jewel, supra note 3, at 1157–60 (explaining Bourdieu’s theory of how the law 
emphasizes neutrality and objectivity in order to instill public faith in the system, a process 
that tends to obscure how legal outcomes often favor dominant groups). 
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institutional organizational forms that can restrict human dignity.143  
Moreover, generally speaking, there is little room within liberal 
discourse for a deeper structural critique of how our institutions 
perpetuate longstanding patterns of inequality.144  For instance, in the 
realm of economics, rational actor theory illustrates how a liberal 
humanist idea leaves little space for a foundational critique.  While 
the theory that social outcomes are a product of an individual’s free 
choice in the market sounds egalitarian and fair, it also operates as a 
closed ontology that leaves no room to discuss how most differential 
social outcomes result from preexisting differences in capital 
holdings.145 
Within traditional narratives about American lawyers, 
expressions of liberal humanism assume that our legal institutions 
enable lawyers to reside in autonomous positions of power, exercise 
wisdom, do good things in society, and make a comfortable living.146  
143. From a critical theory perspective, David Baker provides a good explanation of
the internal conflict within liberal humanism between individual autonomy and 
institutional organizations: 
[L]iberalism has normative, institutional, and theoretical content. The
key normative content, which is the most persistent and fundamental
aspect of liberalism, exalts the values of human equality, self-
determination, and self-realization—that is, of liberty and autonomy.
Historically, the institutional content of liberalism has included capitalist
or market economic forms, bureaucratic organizational forms, and, at its
best, democratic political forms. The theoretical content attempts to
explain and justify liberal institutions in terms of liberal norms, and
sometimes to explain and justify liberal norms themselves. In this
theoretical component, liberalism faces the impossible task of explaining
how its key values of liberty and autonomy are consistent with a social
structure that in reality controls and limits human choice.
David Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 293, 304 (1984). 
144. Thus, “[p]rogress within liberal thought requires first exposing the contradictions
between its institutions and its values and then recommending the reform or 
transformation of those institutions.”  Id. at 304. 
145. See, e.g., Jewel, supra note 3, at 1163–64.  See also MERTZ, supra note 4, at 212.
The concept of individual merit is another example of a liberal humanist idea that leaves 
little room for a deeper critique.  The traditional idea is that an individual’s merit (in the 
form of school prestige, test scores, grades, etc.) determines where he/she ends up in 
society.  However, the merit narrative leaves no space for the empirical reality (at least 
within the legal profession) that one’s place in society is highly influenced by the amount 
of social, cultural, and economic capital one holds prior to entering the education/career 
system.  See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1173–75. 
146. See generally, ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 299 (1993) (The ability
to exercise practical wisdom on behalf of a client requires lawyers to suspend their own 
(financial) self-interest and “clear an affective space in which his client’s interests may be 
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There is the view that the practice of law is a privilege because it 
provides attorneys with the power and influence that comes with 
counseling clients, appearing in court, and otherwise impacting the 
lives of individuals with the law.147  But these humanistic assumptions 
about the practice of law do not necessarily match the alienating 
experience of many of America’s lawyers working in the professional 
hierarchy.  For instance, autonomy, comfort, and the ability to impart 
professional wisdom do not exist for lawyers stuck performing 
monotonous data entry tasks for an hourly wage and no insurance 
benefits.148  A hardworking associate, blindsided by her termination 
coming just six days after a serious personal tragedy, sees little 
humanity within her former law firm.149  A criminal defense attorney’s 
ability to serve society is highly constrained by a criminal justice 
culture that directs the attorney to make decisions that promote 
judicial efficiency but thwart true justice for the client.150 
These lawyers can hardly be blamed for perceiving the practice of 
law as an onerous burden rather than an exalted privilege.  If the 
underlying philosophical premises for American lawyer 
professionalism do not apply to these attorneys, we cannot expect 
them to blindly adhere to the culture’s traditional ideals.  On a 
psychological level, perhaps these online stories are so uncomfortable 
because they question the very core of our professional identity, 
which is based on democratic notions of fairness, justice, and human 
dignity.  Though unpleasant, these deep questions about our 
profession need to be dealt with.  Accordingly, these new critical 
voices should not be dismissed as unprofessional or untoward. 
B. The Rules of Professional Conduct–A Non-Pluralistic View?
To the extent that the Rules of Professional Conduct and the
norms that underlie them can be used to restrict negative lawyer 
comments about the legal profession, legal system, or the judiciary, 
we should critically examine the institutional forces that shaped them. 
A critical evaluation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
entertained with real feeling.”); Susan Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
101, 117 (2008) (citing DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 36 (2007)) 
(Carle places David Luban’s conceptions of lawyer professionalism, wherein the lawyer 
should always strive to promote human dignity, as being based on a philosophy of liberal 
individualism). 
147. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 633, 646–47 (1985) (citing People ex rel. Karlin v.
Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470–71 (1928)). 
148. See supra notes 51–73 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 88–106 and accompanying text.
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supports the conclusion that they may not reflect the views of all 
lawyers as to what it means to behave in a professional manner. 
Accordingly, current rules and norms that restrict attorney speech can 
be viewed as limiting the kinds of lawyers who are allowed to 
contribute to the culture of the profession. 
With respect to lawyers who disparage the legal system or the 
judiciary online, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are 
primarily aimed at policing communication in a litigation context. 
The rules support discipline for statements made about specific 
judges151 and statements that are disruptive to a pending trial.152  While 
discipline may also be imposed for the broad concept of conduct that 
is “prejudicial to the administration of justice,” this rule has generally 
been applied only in a litigation context.153 
Outside of a specific case, however, lawyers who publicly malign 
the legal system and legal profession in a general sense certainly 
violate the norms of the profession, as evidenced by the precepts 
embodied in the Preamble to the Rules.  For instance, paragraph five 
of the Preamble states that “[a] lawyer should demonstrate respect 
for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other 
lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s duty, when 
necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a 
lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.”154  Preamble paragraph 6 
requires lawyers to “further the public’s understanding of and 
confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal 
institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular 
participation and support to maintain their authority.”155  And finally, 
preamble paragraph nine states that lawyers should maintain a 
“professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved 
in the legal system.”156  Arguably, online lawyers who publicly 
151. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a) (2009).
152. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(d) (2009).
153. See generally, 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 84 (2010) (collecting and annotating
discipline cases concerning lawyers who engaged in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).  See also, 16 IA. PRAC., LAWYER & JUDICIAL ETHICS § 
12:4(d)(1) (2010) (the rule prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
“attaches to lawyer conduct that inappropriately disrupts the legal process, impairs the 
ability of a participant in the process to effectively present a case, impedes progress of the 
matter . . . or perverts the disposition of a matter.”). 
154. Preamble, ¶ 5, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983).
155. Id. at ¶ 6.
156. Id. at ¶ 9.
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denigrate the legal system in a way that could be viewed as crude or 
vulgar157 would violate these standards. 
There are two relevant critiques to the ideology of 
professionalism, embodied in the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“Model Rules”).  The first point of critique is that, as 
Professor Amy Mashburn compellingly points out, the ABA’s Model 
Rules might not reflect a broad consensus of all attorneys as to what 
professionalism means.158  Professor Mashburn explains how, at the 
turn of the twentieth century, an elite and exclusive group of lawyers 
within the ABA formulated the first set of ethical rules for the legal 
profession.159  The newly promulgated rules reflected the aristocratic 
ideals of these “best men of the bar,” codifying the idea that lawyers 
should not be concerned with money and that law practice should not 
be conducted as a business or trade.160  At the time the first ethics 
rules were promulgated, there was a general fear among elite 
attorneys that the wrong (i.e., non Anglo-Saxon) kind of persons 
were gaining entry into the profession.161  Mashburn argues that an 
elite group of attorneys continues to define the norms of the legal 
profession, as evidenced by the heavy influence that corporate 
lawyers exercise within the ABA.162 
Mashburn also remarks that the exhortation that lawyers should 
be more civil and polite may not represent the interests of non-elite 
lawyers.163  In fact, concepts of decorum and civility can sometimes 
clash with an attorney’s zealous advocacy for a client or for social 
change.164  The problem with a unitary view of professionalism is that 
it relies on the false premise that the law is a monolithic profession 
that places all attorneys in the same position.165  The reality is that not 
all attorneys can afford to treat the practice of law as a noble 
profession rather than a business or trade.  Furthermore, not all 
attorneys are in a position to engage in deferential and measured 
157. The disapproval of crude and vulgar lawyers can also be viewed as the legal
profession’s attempt to maintain its image as an upper-class culture built around 
distinction and good taste.  The concept of vulgarity, as a polar opposite to the concepts of 
distinction and taste, is a cultural marker for the lower classes.  See Jewel, supra note 3, at 
1170–71, 1197–1201. 
158. Mashburn, supra note 6, at 663–69.
159. Id. at 668–69.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 669.
162. Id. at 672, 675–76.
163. Id. at 655–58, 87.
164. Id. at 686.
165. Id. at 665–67.
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behavior, particularly when they are representing the poor and 
powerless or advocating for radical social change. 
This critique of the Model Rules can be extended to the Internet’s 
lawyer storytellers, who are writing about experiences that do not 
reflect the traditional view of professionalism envisioned by 
America’s more elite lawyers.  For instance, the practice of law is not 
a noble profession for a lawyer being paid by the hour to key in data 
in an airless basement far away from the mahogany and glass offices 
of an elite law firm;166 who must check his or her cell phone at the 
door before beginning work;167 and who is often berated by 
supervising attorneys (usually full-time associates at a prestigious law 
firm) for not keying in entries fast enough.168  In these circumstances, 
the concept of being polite, deferential, and maintaining the public’s 
confidence in the integrity of the legal system does not make much 
sense.  Moreover, if Mashburn is correct and elite and powerful 
practitioners have monopolized the task of codifying our professional 
rules and norms, then it is a positive development that technology 
now gives all attorneys the power to inform the culture of the 
profession. 
C. An Online Community Space for Disenfranchised Lawyers
The narrative outlets described in this paper have the potential to
influence the profession to change for the better, but perhaps more 
importantly, they provide attorneys, shut out from the traditional 
social outlets of the legal profession, a place to go to feel connected 
and human after spending time in a distinctly non-human work 
environment. 
One argument in favor of allowing these narratives to flourish 
online is that this information could reach a critical mass and 
influence true structural change within the profession.  This argument 
has appeal and indeed, the content of these online narratives has been 
picked up by more traditional Internet news outlets, such as the Wall 
166. helpme123, The Lexolution Chicken Coop is Once Again Open for Business,
TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:  THE SWEATSHOP EDITION (Feb. 15, 2010, 10:15 AM), http:// 
temporaryattorney.blogspot.com/2010/02/lexolution-chicken-coop-is-once-again.html. 
167. helpme123, Discover Ready, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:  THE SWEATSHOP 
EDITION (Mar. 20, 2010, 9:24 AM), http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com/2010/ 
03/discoverready.html; helpme123 Blacklisted by Lexolution, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:  
THE SWEATSHOP EDITION (Nov. 17, 2009, 10:08 AM), http://temporary 
attorney.blogspot.com/2009/11/blacklisted-by-lexolution.html. 
168. helpme123, Jones Day: A Follow Up, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:  THE
SWEATSHOP EDITION (Feb. 12, 2010, 12:10 AM), http://temporaryattorney.blogspot. 
com/2010/02/jones-day-follow-up.html. 
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Street Journal’s Law Blog and the New York Times.169  Moreover, 
after reading the contract attorney blogs, a managing partner at one 
law firm decided to integrate a document review department into the 
firm, treating its workers more like full-time employees (albeit 
without benefits).170  Law school administrators might also be listening 
in on these painful stories.  Dean Richard Matasar171 of New York 
Law School has recently stated that law schools might be “exploiting” 
nonelite students by encouraging them to incur excessive debt to 
attend law school when there is only a slim chance that these students 
will find employment that enables them to keep up with their loan 
payments.172 
However, even if these narratives are not able to achieve actual 
structural change, they allow these lawyers a small outlet to express 
the alienation they suffer on a daily basis.  As Michel de Certeau 
writes, it is not likely that a single individual, caught up in an 
institutional system of power and hierarchy, will succeed in effecting 
169. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Law Blog, Thinking About Law School? These Blogs Tell
You Why You Shouldn’t, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 29, 2010, 1:58 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
law/2010/03/29/thinking-about-law-school-these-blogs-tells-you-why-you-shouldnt/; Amir 
Efrati, supra note 78; John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar, 
N.Y. TIMES, September 13, 2009,  available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09 
/13/us/13lawyers.html; Arin Greenwood, Attorney at Blah, WASH. CITY PAPER, Nov. 19, 
2007, available at http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/display.php?id= 34054. 
170. Julie Kay, Contract Lawyers: Cheaper by the Hour, THE NAT’L L.J., Jan. 12, 2009,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202427338861 (the manag-
ing partner stated: “I’ve read the blogs, and we just felt it was not healthy for us, for the 
profession or the clients if there’s a bad environment.”). 
171. Temporary Attorney: The Sweatshop Edition singled Matasar out for its 2009
“beastly behavior award” because of a perceived conflict of interest for concurrently 
serving as the chairman of a student loan company lending to New York Law School and 
as Dean of the law school.  See Dean Richard Slimeball, supra note 62. 
172. Debra Cassens Weiss, Law School Deans Says Schools Exploiting Students Who
Don’t Succeed, A.B.A. J., Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/ news/article/law_ 
dean_says_schools_exploiting_students_who_dont_succeed/.  In the article, Matasar is 
quoted as saying: 
We took them.  We took their money.  We live on their money. . . . And 
if they don’t have a good outcome in life, we’re exploiting them.  It’s our 
responsibility to own the outcomes of our institutions.  If they’re not 
doing well . . . it’s gotta be fixed.  Or we should shut the damn place 
down.  And that’s a moral responsibility that we bear in the academy. 
Id. 
Despite being singled out as a target worthy of attack, Dean Matasar appears to be aware 
of the problems faced by non-elite students and has compellingly written that law schools 
should behave as fiduciaries toward their students, as opposed to self-interested market 
actors.  See Richard A. Matasar, Defining Our Responsibilities: Being an Academic 
Fiduciary, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 67 (2008). 
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true structural change.173  But what can be accomplished are forms of 
resistance in the way one experiences “everyday life.”174  Thus, these 
alternative lawyer narratives validate Certau’s theory that those who 
lack power create their own cultural forms in opposition to the 
dominant culture as a way of “mak[ing] do with what they have” “in a 
network of already established forces and representations.”175 
In addition, these online narratives engender a sense of 
community and belongingness.  Lonely and alienated in the physical 
world, the Internet affords marginalized attorneys spaces that have 
the same neighborly characteristics as a traditional community 
marked by geographic borders.176  Although they are ugly and full of 
verbal wormwood, these online spaces provide frustrated attorneys 
with an outlet for dissent, perhaps relieving some of the stress, 
frustration, and disenchantment that come from working in a hostile 
and dehumanizing profession.  In this case, the community function 
that the Internet affords should trump concerns over professionalism 
and maintaining public confidence in the legal profession. 
D. A Response to Arguments Against a Participatory Culture within the
Legal Profession
Worth considering are three possible arguments against relaxing
the norms within the legal profession to embrace a more vibrant 
culture.  The first deals with the concern that if we relax our 
professional norms and standards, more attorneys will engage in 
irreverent behavior and the already shaky reputation of attorneys (as 
evidenced in the popularity of lawyer jokes)177 will be further 
damaged.  However, as Margaret Tarkington points out with respect 
to the judiciary, this type of slippery-slope argument is based 
primarily on conjecture and surmise.178  Moreover, although our 
173. MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE xiv (1984).  In
describing the alienating environment of modern work life, de Certeau borrows Michel 
Foucault’s concept of “discipline,” which describes how modern institutions employ 
myriad of micro rules, regimentations, and time tables imposed on our everyday life, 
ensuring the retention of social order and the status quo. See e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 205, 216, 220 (1979). 
174. DE CERTEAU, supra note 173, at xiv.
175. Id. at 18, 32.
176. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that the
Internet supports new kinds of communities). 
177. See, e.g., Patricia L. Garcia, Did You Hear the One About the Lawyer? 70 TEX. B. 
J. 960 (2007); Ward Blacklock, Lawyer Bashing: It’s Time to Turn the Tide, 24 ST. MARY’S 
L. J. 1219 (1993) (reflecting the view that the proliferation of lawyer jokes encapsulates the
public’s lack of confidence in the legal profession).
178. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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professional culture should become more relaxed and expansive, most 
attorneys, from the standpoint of self-preservation, will adhere to 
traditional behavioral norms and will decline to speak out against the 
profession with the bitter vitriol and repugnant rhetoric that appears 
on blogs critical of the profession.179  There is a built-in disincentive to 
stray from the dominant code of behavior because transgressive 
conduct carries negative career consequences in terms of the ability to 
find a job and maintain credibility with clients and the courts. 180  
However, we should not deny the choice of some attorneys, operating 
at the margins of the profession, to criticize the profession from 
within, even if these views are expressed in unpalatable ways that run 
contrary to traditional notions of how attorneys are supposed to 
behave. 
The doctrinaire view is that attorneys should always “demonstrate 
a “belief in the essentiality of the chastity of the goddess of justice.”181  
This quote from the Florida Supreme Court exemplifies the outdated 
aristocratic notions that have informed the culture of the legal 
profession for many years.182  However, the Internet has given voice to 
a group of lawyers who would vehemently disagree that there is such 
a thing as a gendered deity of justice or that this deity retains any type 
179. To support her point that the judiciary does not need protection from attorney
criticism, Margaret Tarkington cites to an article by David Pimentel arguing that the 
adversary system incentivizes lawyers to restrain their criticism of the judges they practice 
in front of.  Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in 
Court Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 430 n.390 (2010) (citing David Pimentel, The 
Reluctant Tattletale: Closing the Gap in Federal Judicial Discipline, 76 TENN. L. REV. 909, 
933–34 (2009)).  The loss of goodwill from the bench and loss of respect from professional 
peers can negatively effect an attorney’s reputation and ability to make a living.  Id.  Thus, 
there is a certain amount of self-regulation that goes on within the legal profession.  This 
reasoning can be applied beyond the context of judicial criticism, supporting the 
prediction that relaxing our rules and norms would not unduly harm the legal profession. 
180. See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1178 (explaining how the image of the virtuous passive
attorney exemplifies the belief that only attorneys of preexisting wealth and means are 
capable of maintaining “professional” ideals).  The aristocratic/chivalrous view of the legal 
profession is also reflected in the prohibition on direct solicitation of clients.  This rule, 
now canonized as ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct section 7.3, derives from the 
opinion of the elite lawyers who drafted the first ethics rules for the profession in 1908. 
These lawyers believed that attorneys should not dirty their hands by actively soliciting 
clients but should instead passively await clients “[l]ike young maidens awaiting suitors.” 
See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1178 (citing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: 
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 41 (1976)). 
181. In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686, 690 (Fla. 1973) (quoted in Tarkington, supra note
108, at 1569). 
182. See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1178 (explaining how longstanding professional rules
against lawyer advertising and solicitation were designed to uphold a lawyering model 
based on passive restraint, which reinforces the aristocratic idea that only lawyers of pre-
existing wealth and means have the ability to maintain the dignity of the legal profession). 
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of virginal virtue. The Internet is an appropriate arena to roundly 
challenge the legal profession’s obsolete and unworkable themes and 
author new narratives that reflect an evolving professional identity 
(for better or worse). 
The second argument is that attorneys should resort to more 
traditional means for criticizing the legal system.  If dealing with a 
problematic judge, for instance, the attorney should make a 
complaint to his or her state’s commission on judicial conduct183 or 
appeal that judge’s ruling using the available processes within the 
legal system.184  What this argument misses is that the beauty of the 
Internet is that it provides an alternative way of getting things done 
without having to rely on traditional institutions.185  The Internet’s 
democratic architecture allows all voices to be heard, amplifying the 
most resonant in a way that is unfettered by the formal constraints of 
the legal system.  Sole reliance on the legal system to redress 
problems would be slow, heavily filtered through formalistic legal 
procedures, and would preclude the garnering of mass public support 
for the problem.  Limiting attorney speech to formal legal 
mechanisms would deny the possibility, enabled by participatory 
culture, of obtaining relief186 by sharing narratives that raise 
immediate public awareness and support. 
Finally, there is the argument that criticism of the legal system 
should refrain from vulgarity and crudeness but should instead 
maintain proper decorum and respect.187  However, this argument 
ignores the fact that an idea’s power sometimes derives from the 
inflammatory way in which it is expressed.188  Because the Internet 
183. See Tarkington, supra note 108, at 1602, n.210 (collecting authorities supporting
the idea that in cases where there is a problem with a judge, the appropriate response is to 
file a complaint with the relevant judicial disciplinary authority). 
184. See Witosky, supra note 117, at 314–15 (arguing that if a trial or appellate judge
erred, the professional thing to do is to present the error on its merits to a higher court). 
185. See SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 22 (explaining how new technology has created
“novel alternatives for group action” in competition with “traditional institutional forms 
for getting things done.”). 
186. “Relief” refers to the emotional release that comes with sharing one’s story as
well as possible remedial action by institutions in response to public awareness of the 
problem. 
187. The rhetoric on websites such as Temporary Attorney: The Sweatshop Edition,
Esq. Never, and Third Tier Reality has been referred to as “vulgar” and “disgusting.”  See 
Brian Tamanaha, Wake Up, Fellow Law Professors, to the Casualties of our Enterprise, 
BALKINIZATION (June 13, 2010, 6:48 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/06/wake-up-
fellow-law-professors-to.html. 
188. Justice Rehnquist recognized this point with respect to crude political cartoons,
noting that a cartoon’s success as political commentary seemed to be related to how far it 
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amplifies the stories that hold the most resonance for an audience, 
transgressive rhetoric might be what causes an idea to gain viral 
momentum and reach exponential dimensions in exposure. 
Moreover, to impose such narrow restrictions on the means by which 
an idea can be expressed runs contrary to the democratic ideals of 
participatory culture, which values communication outside the 
bounds of traditional institutions.189 
In advocating a liberty-based theory for expansive First 
Amendment rights, C. Edwin Baker noted the importance of 
individuals being able to control the means by which they express 
their ideas and communicate beyond the confines of traditional 
institutions.190  Baker wrote that communication outside the bounds of 
traditional hierarchical institutions has the potential to advance 
“increased human autonomy and self-determinism, and the 
attainment of a less alienated, more democratic society.”191  Writing 
before the advent of the Internet, Baker based his thesis on the idea’s 
democratic potential.192  As the Internet is now making this potential a 
reality, a too-rigid application of our professional rules and norms 
should not retard this progress. 
VI. Conclusion
By allowing a wider swath of participants to comment on the 
culture of the law, the Internet is changing the face of the legal 
profession. The online voices of attorneys are sometimes grating and 
difficult to stomach, but they often expose deep problems within our 
profession that otherwise would not be aired.  It will do no good to 
silence the voices that are identifying cracks in the structure of our 
profession simply because they do not comply with traditional 
professional norms.  These stories are culturally valuable because 
their narrative approach and outsider perspective shed new light on 
what it means to be a lawyer in America.  Further, the structural 
critique of law practice as an alienating, nonautonomous, and 
went ‘‘beyond the bounds of good taste and conventional manners.’”  Hustler Magazine v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (quoting CHARLES PRESS, THE POLITICAL CARTOON 251 
(1981)). 
189. See Benkler, supra note 7, at 212–14 (explaining the concept that the Internet’s
elimination of mass communication costs has had a democratizing effect on American 
society). 
190. See C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First
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undignified enterprise is a critique that needs to be heard. 
Accordingly, our professional norms and ethical rules should not 
operate to shut these narratives out.  In the interest of enriching our 
professional identity, we should embrace the participatory culture of 
the Internet and allow a diversity of viewpoints to flourish in the 
profession. 
